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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The last issue of Labor Research Review was devoted to what we called "the IAM District 100 
model" for fighting concessions. Six articles over more than 90 pages explained the complex and 
sophisticated campaign the Machinists waged at Eastern Airlines to win a 32% wage increase and to 
preserve existing work rules. Three times—in March, June and October of 1983—District 100 Machinists 
had turned back the demands and threats not only of Eastern, but of the banks to which Eastern owes 
millions—among them giants of finance like Chase Manhattan and Citibank. 
But as the issue, which we called UP AGAINST THE GLOOM AND DOOM: Aggressive Unionism at Eastern 
Airlines, was ready to go to the printer, IAM 100 finally relented and gave up a concessions contract at the 
end of the year. 
What we were about to present to our readers as a model of union struggle had just been defeated. After 
we digested the sick feelings in our stomachs, we decided to go with the issue the way it was. On 
reflection we still felt that the way IAM 100 conducted itself in an impossibly difficult bargaining situation 
was a beacon for the labor movement in these troubled times. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The last issue of Labor Research Review was devoted to what we 
called "the IAM District 100 model" for fighting concessions. Six 
articles over more than 90 pages explained the complex and 
sophisticated campaign the Machinists waged at Eastern Airlines to 
win a 32% wage increase and to preserve existing work rules. Three 
times—in March, June and October of 1983—District 100 Machinists 
had turned back the demands and threats not only of Eastern, but 
of the banks to which Eastern owes millions—among them giants 
of finance like Chase Manhattan and Citibank. 
But as the issue, which we called UP AGAINST THE GLOOM 
AND DOOM: Aggressive Unionism at Eastern Airlines, was ready 
to go to the printer, IAM 100 finally relented and gave up a 
concessions contract at the end of the year. 
What we were about to present to our readers as a model of union 
struggle had just been defeated. After we digested the sick feeiings 
in our stomachs, we decided to go with the issue the way it was. 
On reflection we still felt that the way IAM 100 conducted itself in 
an impossibly difficult bargaining situation was a beacon for the labor 
movement in these troubled times. 
The District 100 Machinists did their homework. Their contract 
research team studied the company and its problems in detail, forced 
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the company to give it every piece of information imaginable, and, 
in the end, understood the company as well or better than either 
Eastern management or its bankers. The leadership educated the 
district's 13,500 members in the subtleties of corporate finance in 
a way few International or local unions have ever even dreamed of, 
and then mobilized that membership around two successive strike 
threats which backed down and humiliated Eastern and its 
management. And, through it all, they exposed a series of company 
lies and distortions that destroyed Eastern's credibility and defanged 
an anti-union press and general public opinion. 
The courage, creativity and solidarity displayed by the District 100 
Machinists in the course of their struggle are as important a part of 
the historical record as their final defeat. And their struggle is no 
less a "model" of union strategy and tactics simply because in the 
end they did not succeed in protecting themselves from all harm. 
But the IAM 100 model doesn't end with the three victories it 
achieved. It is present even in the defeat. The concessions contract 
the Machinists finally agreed to is itself distinctive and pathbreaking. 
It deserves more careful analysis, and labor leaders faced with similar 
situations should watch carefully how certain provisions in this 
contract work out over the next several years. 
Without getting bogged down in the specific details, we think it 
is worthwhile to begin debating some of the general principles raised 
by that contract, lb this end, Labor Research Review asked the 
authors of the following articles to express their views of these 
principles, pro and con. The contract summary below is given in 
order to help shape the debate around these principles. 
1) If a company is in danger of going bankrupt should the union 
grant concessions? 
The easy answer to this is an obvious "yes." But what does "in 
danger of going bankrupt" mean? Eastern had used the threat of 
bankruptcy as a club against the Machinists since 1975, when an 
initial wage concession had been granted. The union's research 
showed that management had deliberately cultivated its negative 
financial condition through accounting tricks and through a high-
debt, fast-track investment program. Time and again, the union's 
leadership countered Eastern's bankruptcy scenarios (what the 
Machinists came to call "the gloom and doom") with two points: 
a) Eastern had systematically exaggerated its negative financial 
condition. 
b) Insofar as Eastern was in financial trouble, it was not because 
of workers' wages but because of an irrational plane-buying 
spree which served the interests not of Eastern but of Boeing 
and of the bankers who were interlocked as lenders and 
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As District 100 President Charles Bryan said in the fall of 1983, 
"There's no question that they have a financial problem. Our point 
is that it's one of their own creation and they must adjust the causes 
and not just keep coming to us to remove the effect or to subsidize 
the effect." 
Few unions have developed as complete and sophisticated an 
understanding of their employer as I AM 100 has of Eastern and its 
bankers. In the end, based on unrestricted access to company 
documents and books, the union leadership concluded that Eastern 
was indeed in immediate danger of bankruptcy. 
Thus, the union's decision to grant concessions was not based on 
a vague fear of "the danger of bankruptcy," and certainly not on any 
trust in the company's description of itself. It was based on a solid 
understanding of the company's condition and on a strategic 
assessment of the union's situation. 
At that point, however, a union bargaining with a single company 
in an organized industry is not necessarily faced with an inevitable 
choice for concessions. It must ask itself what its concessions will 
do to industry standards, and whether there is any reason to think 
that allowing one's employer to go bankrupt would benefit union 
workers in the industry as a whole. Conversely, it must assess how 
a refusal to grant concessions which resulted in bankruptcy would 
affect other union and non-union workers both inside and outside 
the industry. 
2) Is the way a wage cut is structured as important or even more 
important than the size of the cut? 
The size of the pay cut the District 100 Machinists gave up—18%— 
is unusually large, even in the concessions environment of the last 
several years. But the union structured this pay cut in a way that 
maintained two important principles: 
a) The existing wage rates, including scheduled increases, were 
preserved and thus the industry standard is intact. The 18% will be 
deducted from each worker's paycheck from January 1, 1984, to 
January 1, 1985. At the end of 1984, the deductions will end and 
each worker will begin being paid at a higher rate than when the 
deductions began. 
b) Because the wage giveback is in the form of a cash deduction 
rather than a rate reduction, the pay cut is not a "labor cost savings" 
but a direct infusion of cash into the company. It clearly goes, in 
visible amounts, from employee to employer. Only a fool would give 
large amounts of money to a company without receiving something 
in return. IAM 100 is no fool. The Machinists will receive a total 
of $21.6 million in common stock and $65.7 million in a special form 
m 
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of preferred stock. The stock will be allocated to individual workers 
based on their specific "investment" in the company; the stock is 
placed in a "blocked" trust until 1986 and 1987, when workers can 
either take possession of their allocated shares, sell them or leave 
them in the trust. District 100 will elect a trustee who will vote the 
IAM trust's stock at shareholders meetings. 
IAM bargainers invented the special form of preferred stock which 
they call "non-cumulative, participating, convertible, preferred 
stock." This is a very complicated concoction, but the upshot of it 
is this: If Eastern eventually goes bankrupt, holders of this preferred 
stock will be paid before holders of common stock; thus, about two-
thirds of the Machinists' investment is protected in case the worst 
happens. If, on the other hand, Eastern stays solvent, holders of this 
preferred stock are guaranteed to receive the full value of the stock 
if they hold it long enough. 
It is worth noting that District 100 did not originally seek to become 
stockholders and to take an equity position in the company. Rather, 
the IAM bargainers wanted the pay deductions to be a loan, which 
would be paid back with 10% interest by a specified date. In either 
case, as either lender or stockholder, the Machinists arranged a very 
different kind of pay cut than the standard wage-rate reduction which 
has become common over the last several years and for which the 
union in most cases has received nothing in return. 
3) Can the union win effective power over management as a trade-
off for wage concessions? If it can, is management control (and 
responsibility) something that unions should be seeking? 
The District 100 Machinists saw Eastern's financial problems as 
deriving from a faulty business plan and investment program. Thus 
as part of their new agreement with Eastern, they demanded and 
won the right to veto, on a one-time basis only, both Eastern's 1984 
business plan and the financial restructuring program made possible 
by the union's wage concessions. 
On a continuing basis, the union also won the following 
management rights: 
• the right to review the company's business plans, major capital 
expenditures and expansions and "to participate in the 
company's decision-making process" in these areas. 
• the right to appeal any company plan or decision directly to the 
board of directors. 
• unlimited access to all company financial information. 
i • a right to participate in the design of new facilities and in the 
re-design of existing facilities. 
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• a seat on the board of directors. 
• a requirement that the company disclose a full list of all the 
consultants it hires. 
In addition to these direct management rights, the union agreed 
to set up several "joint review" committees which will look at "labor-
management relations," "supervisory and lead roles and functions," 
"employee benefit plan administration" and "job security and 
reduction of contracting out work." The union preserved its 
previously won joint control of its pension fund (though Eastern still 
has a majority on the pension fund's board), and further committed 
itself to the implementation of an "employee involvement" program. 
Most of these "joint review" committees are related to how the 
union handled management's now standard complaint that 
"inflexible" union work rules unduly restrict management in 
directing the work force and therefore reduce productivity. Unlike 
many other unions which have allowed extensive reorganization of 
job classifications and work tasks as part of concessions contracts, 
IAM 100 refused any changes in its existing work rules. 
Instead, it pledged to management that it would help the company 
achieve a 5% increase in productivity. The union has an extensive 
file on inefficient management practices, including excessive super-
vision and irrational use of outside contractors. The membership 
knows how to increase productivity if management will just get off 
their backs and if they can be sure that productivity growth will not 
eliminate their jobs. The union hopes to use the joint review process 
on a day-to-day basis to trade productivity increases for reductions 
in contracting out and for the withdrawal of excessive supervision. 
Thus, IAM 100 has involved itself in nearly all aspects of Eastern's 
management—from the shopfloor to the boardroom. The question 
is how effective this involvement will be in turning the company 
around—both its finances and its labor relations. And even if 
effective, should a union be this deeply involved in "running the 
company"? Over time will they become a "company union" in the 
sense that they concern themselves with company profits and 
"competitiveness" to such an extent that they lose solidarity with 
and ignore the interests of their union brothers and sisters at other 
companies? 
More broadly, are the kinds of trade-offs IAM 100 won at Eastern 
what other unions in tough bargaining situations should be pursuing? 
Is the "IAM 100 model" a model for labor in the 1980s? Labor 
Research Review posed these questions to the authors of the 
following articles. 
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